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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 19331 regulates the initial disclosure of information regarding the sale and transfer of securities. This statute,
along with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 was enacted to serve
as a deterrent to fraud in securities transactions. The remedial nature of the statute was accentuated by the statute's mandated discloto protect investors from
sure of certain information in order
3
unscrupulous securities promoters.
Section 12 of the 1933 Act establishes a cause of action that can be
brought by a purchaser against a seller who has acted in violation of
the statute. 4 This cause of action provides for a rescission of any se1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78aa (1988)[hereinafter "The Act"].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
3. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
(a) unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell
such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or
otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or
transmit any prospectus relating to any security with respect to
which a registration statement has been filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section [10]; or
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section [10].
(c) it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication and
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security,
or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or
stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement)
any public proceeding or examination under section [8].
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
4. Section 12 provides that:
Any person who(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5 of the Act], or
(2) offers or sells a security ... by the use any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
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curities purchase or for the collection of damages if the disenfranchised investor has sold the security.
One question which has led to a significant amount of litigation
under section 12 is the issue of when someone who participates in the
distribution of false or misleading information regarding a security
should be held liable as a "seller" of securities under the Act. Section
12(1) provides that any person who "offers or sells a security" in direct
violation of the registration requirements set forth in section 5 may be
liable in an action brought by the purchaser.5 Section 12(2) similarly
imposes liability on any offeror or seller of a security who communicates any form of information containing a material untrue statement
or fails to include any material fact.6
The reason that investors have persistently sought to establish liability against attorneys and accountants under section 12, is that the
provision is viewed as imposing strict liability on anyone violating it.
There is no question that an attorney who prepares false or misleading documents in connection with the sale of a new securities offering
will be subject to an action under the 1933 Act. However, if such conduct is not viewed as constituting participation as a "seller" under section 12, then the attorney is afforded the statutory defenses provided
under section 11. These defenses include but are not limited to: due
diligence, reliance on expert opinion, or lack of causation, and are
available to everyone except the issuer. Quite obviously, the investor
has everything to gain by pursuing strict liability under section 12
while denying the attorney any defenses comparable to what would be
available in a traditional common law negligence lawsuit. The question of whether "seller" status should be extended to collateral participants in the registration and sales processes, such as attorneys and
accountants, and thereby subject them to the strict liability standards
of section 12, is the subject of this Article.
As third party investors in failed business ventures sought to expand the liability net during the last decade, they quite naturally
looked to the culpability of attorneys and accountants who had participated in preparation of legal and financial documents supporting the
failed enterprise. So pervasive was the zeal to extend the liability of
failed business ventures that the large accounting firms took a formal
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,

who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest.., upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).

5. Id- § 772.
6. Id. § 771.
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position that a liability crisis was on the verge of decimating the profession unless something was done to curb these lawsuits. 7 Accountants, in particular, have watched as their liability has been expanded
through a series of judicial rulings. Interestingly, in more recent
years the courts have evidenced a willingness to revisit the liability
issue, and in fact, give every appearance that a period of judicial retrenchment is beginning.
The issue of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was recently considered by the
United States Supreme Court in the 1994 case, Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstate Bank.8 In that case the Court held that under
this section, a civil liability action against accountants for aiding and
abetting securities fraud could not be established.9 Similarly, a year
earlier the Court carved a more limited interpretation of RICO actions
against accountants in a case involving auditor liability. In Reves v.
Ernst & Young ,1O the plaintiffs had filed suit against the auditors alleging that they had been involved in a fraudulent sale of securities
scheme.'3 The Court chose to narrowly interpret the manner in which
RICO can be applied to accountants performing the auditing function,
and the case has generally been regarded by professionals as an appropriate step in the direction of limiting accountants' liability.12
As for state law actions, the Supreme Court of California rejected
its longstanding reliance on the "foreseeable users" rule in third party
negligence actions against professionals in Bily v. Arthur Young &
Company.'3 The California court adopted the position set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides that third parties should
be afforded protection in such cases only where it can be demonstrated
that they fall within a limited class of individuals who are known to be
actual or potential users of the information.14
The interesting aspect of this shift in judicial temperament regarding the liability of accountants and other professionals involved in facilitating business transactions is that during the same time period
these third parties attempted to establish liability under section 12(2).
However, while all these other aforementioned legal avenues being
pursued by disenfranchised investors were producing one court vic7. AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccouNTANTs, A SPECIAL REPORT BY
THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION, AICPA (1993); ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co. ET AL., THE LIABILITY CRis IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (Aug. 6, 1992).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
Id. at 1455.
113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1172.

13. 834 P.2d 745, 755-57 (Cal. 1992).
14. Id. at 757-59.
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tory after another, the judiciary has remained consistent in rejecting
the theory that collateral participants, such as accountants and lawyers, who advise and represent the failed business venture, ought to
be held liable under section 12(2) as "sellers" of securities. The federal
courts have been steadfast in this position since the Supreme Court's
Pinter v. Dahl15 decision in 1988.
Even though both sections 12(1) and 12(2) contain comparable language referring to offering or selling a security, significant controversy
existed as to whether an individual had to be both an offeror and the
seller of the securities in order to be liable under the section. A
straightforward interpretation of both subsections would seem to indicate that anyone who offers to sell a security would only be liable if she
also acted as the seller of the security. This interpretation focuses on
the passage of title rather than the activities involved in promoting,
soliciting, and distributing information regarding the security issue.
Another interpretation as to who should be held liable under these
two subsections as a seller of securities focuses on the broader concept
of solicitation and emphasizes the remedial nature of the statute relative to congressional intent that those who participate in the solicitation of possible purchasers be held accountable. Accordingly, several
courts of appeal adopted the "substantial factor" test as a basis for
liability under section 12.16 This test went beyond the strict language
of the statute by imposing liability on collateral participants who
played a material role in the selling process but who did not actually
pass title to the securities.17 The substantial factor test was variously
criticized for its deviation from a strict reading of the statute.'8 The
issue focused on just how broadly section 12 should be interpreted in
order to achieve the remedial purpose of the statute.
The seller status controversy was clarified in Pinterv. Dahl where
the Supreme Court rejected the substantial factor standard' 9 and held
that statutory seller status should also include "an individual who engages in solicitation, an activity not inherently confined to the actual
owner, within the scope of section 12."20 Although Pinter was a sec-

tion 12(1) case and did not involve professionals such as accountants
15. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
16. Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1988); Foster v. Jesup &

17.
18.
19.
20.

Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838,844-46 (11th Cir. 1985); Anderson v. Aurotek, 774
F.2d 927,930(9th Cir. 1985); Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421(5th Cir. 1980);
Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawler v. Gilliam,
569 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (4th Cir. 1978).
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosionof the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: the Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 921
(1984).
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653-54 (1988).
Id. at 643.
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and lawyers, the significant question that is now presented concerns
the extent to which this case precedent should be extended to cover
the activities of those professionals who are materially involved in the
structuring and selling of a security issue. Specifically, the role of accountants and attorneys is particularly critical in the registration and
distribution process, and courts must now address when the conduct
of these individuals transcends the solicitation caveat contained
within the Pinter case. 21 At present, the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal have issued rulings in cases involving professionals
22
relative to their liability as securities sellers under Pinter.
This Article deals with the cases that have raised this issue and
the reasons that the federal courts have uniformly and repeatedly rejected this cause of action. First, a review is provided of the criteria
set forth by the Supreme Court in Pinterv. Dahl to be used in deter23
mining whether or not someone qualifies as a seller of securities.
Secondly, the cases decided pursuant to Pinterwill be analyzed in an
effort to discern any commonalities with regard to the liability of professionals in the security issuance process.2 4 In this effort the role of
the accountant will be considered in the security placement process
and appropriate professional standards will be reviewed in determining the present liability status of these professionals.25
II.
A.

ESTABLISHING SELLER STATUS UNDER SECTION 12(2)
Pinter v. Dahl-Background

Maurice Dahl, a California real estate broker and investor, was interested in entering the oil business and made several unsuccessful
attempts to do so. He subsequently was introduced to Billy J. Pinter
who was an oil and gas driller in Texas and Oklahoma operating
under the firm name Black Gold Oil Company.26 Pinter represented
himself to be a licensed oil and gas securities broker-dealer in Texas
with 20 years experience. 2 7 He also informed Dahl of five oil wells
21. The Supreme Court in Pinter did not address this specific issue. It merely noted
that the substantial factor test was so broad so as to bring all types of collateral
participants within its purview. Id. at 651.
22. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989); Wilson v.
Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989).
23. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 212-229 and accompanying text.
26. Petitioner's Appendix at 31, Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)(No. 86-805). Respondent Dahl had invested in a number of other oil deals in 1980 and 1981
through several closely held corporations. Dahl had also hired an expert to find
appropriate oil and gas properties for leasing. It was this expert who introduced
Dahl to Billy J. Pinter.
27. Opposition Brief at 6, Pinter (No. 86-805).
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that were available for immediate leasing.28 After inspecting the
properties and reviewing pertinent drilling records provided by
Pinter, Dahl concluded that the investment was sound and loaned
$20,000 to Pinter to reserve the leases until other investors could be
29
located.
Based on Dahl's advice eleven persons decided to invest about
$7,500 each in the project.3o Each individual was a personal friend,
family member or business associate of Dahl who relied exclusively on
his opinions in reaching a decision to invest in the project.3 ' With one
exception the investors resided in the State of California and did not
personally visit or inspect the leased properties. 3 2 Not only did they
rely on the representations made by Dahl in reaching the decision to
invest, they also received his assistance in completing letter contracts.3 3 For his role in securing the additional investors Dahl received no compensation or commissions of any kind.34 The lease
contracts contained a clause noting that registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission had not been completed. 35
When the leases subsequently proved to be worthless, Dahl and
the other co-investors sought to establish that a fraud had been committed by Pinter and that the only appropriate remedy would be rescission of the contracts based on the section 12(1) prohibition against
selling unregistered securities. 3 6 They sought damages under section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.37 In
a counterclaim Pinter argued that Dahl had misrepresented the investment experience of himself and the other investors and had not
provided the buyers with all the material information required to
evaluate the investment project. 38 Pinter also alleged that Dahl had
agreed to manage certain financial aspects of the venture but had also
28. Petitioner's Appendix at 32, Pinter(No. 86-805).
29. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 625-26 (1988). Following the inspection of the drilling records Dahl concluded that "there was no way to lose." Id
30. Id. at 626. Dahl personally invested about $310,000 in the leases. The other
investors were either close friends or family members of Dahl and included: his
brother, his fiancee, his accountant, the bank officer handling his construction
loans, a construction business partner, his construction financier, his construction-business insurance agent and other business persons. Petitioner's Appendix
at 33, Pinter (No. 86-805).
31. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 625 (1988).
32. Petitioner's Appendix at 32, Pinter(No. 86-805).
33. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 625 (1988).

34. Petitioner's Appendix at 34, Pinter(No. 86-805).
35. The contracts noted that the entries were being sold "without the benefit of registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and on reliance of rule 146
thereunder." Opposition Brief at 39, Pinter, (No. 86-805).
36. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 627 (1988).
37. Id. at n.4. The Supreme Court did not consider the section 10(b) claims asserted
by the respondents. Id.

38. Id. at 628.
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agreed not to get involved in operational matters.3 9 From Pinter's
point of view this involvement was the primary reason why the business venture did not qualify for a private placement exemption from
registration requirements established in the 1933 Act.40 Pinter contended that it would be inequitable to permit Dahl to seek legal redress with the other investors. Pinter claimed that he and Dahl were
equally at fault, and therefore, in pari delicto.41
The district court ruled that Dahl and the other investors could
rescind or cancel the contracts under section 12(1) since the investments should have been registered as securities. 42 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed this decision by ruling that Dahl was not a "seller" within the
context of section 12 because he had not received any pecuniary benefit from his promotional activities. 43 A subsequent request for rehearing was denied, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case. 4 4

B. Analysis of Pinter
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals using a slightly different rationale. Initially, the
Court recognized that the definition of a statutory seller could not be
39. Id.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988)(creating the "private offering exceptions" from registration requirements imposed by the Act). Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501
to .508 (1994), currently governs non-public offerings. An offering will be exempt
if it meets the following stipulations:
[Tihe offering must (1) not be made by any means or form of general
solicitation or advertising, (2) be made only to those persons whom the
issuer has reasonable grounds to believe are of knowledge and experience which would enable them to evaluate the merits of the issue or who
are financially able to bear the risk; (3) be made only to those persons
who have access to the same kind of information as would be contained
in a registration statement. Under this rule, the issuer must have reasonable grounds to believe, and must believe, that there are no more
than thirty-five purchasers from the issuer.
Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1981)(citing
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980)).
41. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 628 (1988). For a complete discussion of the inpari
delicto issue, see Robert A. Prentice, Section 12 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933: The
Case of the Overly Eager Investor, 23 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 697 (1988-89).
42. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 628 (1988).
43. Pinter v. Dahl, 787 F.2d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that Dahl was a substantial factor in consummating the securities purchase;
however, it held that anyone who acts as a promoter must be "motivated by a
desire to confer a direct or indirect benefit on someone other than the person he
has advised to purchase." Id. This ruling was supported by the rationale that
liability should not be imposed without fault or knowledge on "friends and family
members who give one another gratuitous advice on investment matters." This
would be an unreasonable interference with established patterns of social discourse. Id.
44. The rehearing was denied by an 8-6 vote. Dahl v. Pinter, 794 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.
1986).
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restricted simply to people who passed title to securities. 4 5 Looking to
section 2(3) of the Securities Act, the Court noted that the term "sell"
includes "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value,"4 6 and that the term "offer" necessarily includes "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to
buy."4 7 Relying on these definitions the Court concluded that a statu-

tory seller was not necessarily restricted to the actual owner of the
securities but also must include those who engage in solicitation of
offers to buy.48
This conclusion was supported by reasoning that the solicitation of
a buyer is an extremely critical stage of the selling process and is directly aimed at producing a sale.4 9 The inclusion of solicitors within
the statutory definition of seller was conditioned on the requirement
that the individual's "motivation is solely to benefit the buyer."50 In
accordance with the strict language of section 12(1), statutory liability
should only encompass those individuals who solicit a purchase "motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interest or
those of the securities owner."'51 By ruling in this fashion the Pinter
Court rejected the long-standing substantial factor standard that had
been used by the Fifth Circuit. This standard was considered to be too
heavily focused on an individual's involvement in the securities transaction and surrounding circumstances rather than looking at the relationship between purchaser and seller. In effect, the Supreme Court
was rejecting any judicial inquiry into a seller's motivation as a proper
basis for determining statutory status as a seller of securities. 5 2
Although appropriate in tort law analysis, the elements of reliance
and causation were held to be inappropriate in analyzing a statutory
cause of action imposing a strict liability requirement.53 The Court
was also concerned that the substantial factor test would extend liability to collateral participants who were only remotely related to the
45. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 643 (1988).
46. Id.
47.
48.
49.
50.

15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988).
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1988).
Id. at 646-47.
Id. at 647.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 651. The Court stated:
The deficiency of the substantial factor test is that it divorces the
analysis of seller status from any reference to the applicable statutory
language and from any examination of section 12 in the context of the
total statutory scheme. Those courts that have adopted the approach
have not attempted to ground their analysis in the statutory language.... Instead, they substitute the concept of substantial participation in the sales transaction, or proximate causation of the plaintiff's
purchase, for the words 'offers or sells' in section 12.
Id.
53. Id. at 652.
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sales transaction. 5 4 This could necessarily include "securities professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is only
in the performance of their professional services."55 The Court then
remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for determination as to
whether Dahl had encouraged the other investors in order to further
his own personal financial interest or that of Mr. Pinter.56
Pinteris a critical case with regard to the seller status controversy
in that is establishes a two step process for determining seller liability. First, anyone who passes title of a security to a buyer who gives
value in return will be classified as a seller under section 12(1).57
However, where the transferor is not the title holder, the second part
of the analysis requires an inquiry as to whether the individual solicited the purchase of the security.58 Liability under this part of the
test is imposed only where the solicitation is successful and is motivated by the desire to achieve a personal pecuniary gain or interest or
to serve that same interest of the security owner. Obviously, it is this
solicitation analysis that is critical to determining whether or not accountants and/or attorneys can be held liable as sellers of securities
under section 12(1). It should also be noted that a person who did not
have title to a security could assist the selling process but not be held
liable as long as she did not intend to benefit herself financially or
assist the title owner in achieving a similar financial gain.
This case also makes clear that the substantial factor test utilized
in the Fifth Circuit will no longer be the appropriate test for establishing seller status liability.5 9 In reality the substantial factor test was
much broader than the Pinter standard in that almost anyone involved with any aspect of a security transaction could be found potentially liable as a seller.60 Case law demonstrates that attorneys, 6 1
investment bankers6 2 and accountants6 8 who provide material assistance in drafting supporting documentation for security issuances were
the primary targets under the substantial factor test.
Another contribution made by the Pinter case is the Court's effort
to define the term "purchaser" relative to section 12(1).64 Section 12
54. Id. at 651.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 655.

57. Id. at 642-43.
58. Id. at 646-47.
59. Id. at 650-51. The Court ruled that the substantial factor test "divorces the analysis of seller status from any reference to the applicable statutory language and
from any examination of § 12 in the context of the total statutory scheme." Id. at
651.

60. Id. at 653-54.
61. Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal. 1985).

62. Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986).
63. Gold v. LTV Corp, 1984 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,654 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
64. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 645 (1988).
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liability is predicated on establishing plaintiff's standing as a purchaser of a security, and anyone failing to meet this requirement is
precluded from seeking the statute's strict liability remedies. 65 The
reason that this definition is critical is because the statute itself simply defines the terms "sell" and "sale."6 6 The Court stated that liability under section 12 could only occur where a sale had been
established; and therefore, the word "purchase" had to be compared
with the statutory term "sale."67 Since the terms "sell" and "offer" are
the primary focus of the 1933 Act, the Court very neatly incorporated
the act of solicitation within the same process. 6 8 In equating the term
sale with a purchase, the Court established that a security purchase
could occur where title was passed to a purchaser or where the purchaser bought the security as a result of overt solicitation. 69 It is evident that the Court was stating that where a sale is established there
is impliedly a purchase as well. Furthermore, the purchase analysis is
the same as that put forward to determine whether a collateral participant should also be deemed to be a statutory seller under the 1933
Act.
An important limiting feature of the Pinter case is the Court's refusal to extend its holding beyond section 12(1).70 Since sections 12(1)

and 12(2) include similar purchaser and seller requirements, the
Court could have provided a consistent standard to be used in all section 12 litigation. This is material to attorneys and accountants since
their liability under the 1933 Act could be predicated on conduct challenged under either sections 12(1) or 12(2). Furthermore, a key component part of the Pinter decision was the emphasis on the word
"solicit" and the process of "solicitation."71 It is the solicitation process
which presents the greatest possibility for attorney and accountant liability with regard to the selling and distribution of securities. Even
though Pinterwas not specific as to what type of conduct would constitute solicitation on the part of attorneys and accountants, several subsequent cases have been decided by the Second, Seventh and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal which have addressed this issue directly 72 .

These cases speak more forthrightly relative to the type of conduct for
which attorneys and accountants will be held liable pursuant to the
Pinter decision.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 646.
Id. at 642 n.20.
Id. at 646-47.
See supra note 22 and infra notes 138, 163 and 182 for case citations.
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III. EXTENDING PINTER TO ATTORNEYS AND
ACCOUNTANTS
A.

Second Circuit-Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C.

In March 1981, plaintiff Kenneth Wilson was contacted by Fred
Rodolfy, chairman and principal shareholder of Saintine Exploration
and Drilling Corporation ("Saintine"). 73 Rodolfy suggested that Wilson invest in the stock of Saintine, recommending the company as an
excellent investment.74 In early April 1981, Saintine's counsel, Ruffa
& Hanover, sent Wilson a private placement memorandum and subscription materials for a one million share private offering in Saintine
stock. 7 5 These materials were accompanied by a letter on Ruffa &
Hanover firm stationery stating that the materials had been provided
pursuant to the request of Saintine officials.76
The subscription materials explained that the company had been
formed to explore and develop oil and gas interests in Central
America, specifically in Honduras.7 7 The memorandum also explicitly
stated that Saintine had signed contractual agreements providing it
exclusive rights to explore and develop certain oil and gas interests in
Honduras.7S In effect, this statement was a misrepresentation since
such an agreement was not entered into until May 27, 1981, and ultimately finalized at a later date.79 Wilson ultimately invested $36,000
in 90,000 shares of Saintine stock on May 7, 1981.80 The company
never pursued the Honduran drilling program as promised, and subsequently, Rodolfy informed Wilson that his investment would be returned.81 Only $5,000 of the original investment was ever refunded to
Wilson.82
Wilson filed an action against the company and Ruffa & Hanover
alleging that they were liable as sellers of securities under section
12(2) of the Securities Act.S3 The district court held in favor of Wilson
since Ruffa & Hanover had prepared the statement and the agreement had not yet been completed. A panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment against the law firm holding that a
section 12 action against non-selling collateral participants, such as a
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1125.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1988).
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law firm, required proof of causation. 8 4 Even though the agreement to
conduct the Honduran drilling operation had been reached subsequent to the issuance of the private placement memorandum, the
court held that Wilson had not established that his losses had been
caused as a result of this misrepresentation.8 5 The Second Circuit
later vacated this opinion and permitted the parties to rebrief and
reargue the case in light of Pinter v. Dahl. The court ultimately afon the seller status grounds confirmed its original holding based
86
tained within the Pinter case.
In its final decision, the Second Circuit noted that Pinterexpressly
held that statutory sellers will be liable under section 12(1) regardless
of whether loss causation is established.8 7 It also stated that the
Pinter court limited its holding to section 12(1); however, the Second
Circuit noted case precedent in which it had concluded that sections
12(1) and 12(2) are identical in meaning.8 8 By virtue of this conclusion, the statutory seller status test established in Pintercould be appropriately applied to the actions of Ruffa & Hanover relative to its
role in seeking Wilson's investment in Saintine.8 9
The Second Circuit went on to state that the Pintercase had the
effect of expanding in some cases and contracting in others the category of individuals who might potentially be held liable under section
12(2).90 Circuit case law prior to Pinterhad established a distinction
between individuals in privity with a buyer versus collateral participants in the same securities transaction. Where privity existed, section 12(2) was to be applied literally and this included strict liability
for any negligent misrepresentation. 9 1 Collateral participants, on the
other hand, only92 faced liability where scienter and loss causation
could be proven.
84. Id. at 86.

85. Id. at 85.
86. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir.
1989).
87. Id. at 1126.
88. Id. (citing Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943)).
The court also held that the Pinterstandard applied to section 12(2). Id. (citing
Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1988)).
89. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989).
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1298 (2d Cir. 1973).
92. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989). The court cited its decision in Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 803 F.2d
749 (2d Cir. 1986), where a partnership's general partners exchanged all shares
of the partnership for stock in another firm as a method of completing their payout obligation to the limited partners. The stock that was received ultimately
traded at a deficient price and the limited partners filed a lawsuit. The Second
Circuit held that the general partners were not collateral participants in the
transaction because they were not in contractual privity with the limited part-
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For those individuals not in privity with the plaintiff but who
would have been categorized as collateral participants under previous
circuit caselaw, statutory seller status would be accorded under Pinter
where it can be shown that they solicited the purchase for a pecuniary
gain.9 3 Such liability under section 12 for these collateral participants
will be based strictly on the solicitation question regardless of any
proof regarding scienter or loss causation. 94 In this respect the potential liability of these collateral participants is substantially expanded
by the Pinter decision.95 Likewise, individuals who are not in privity
with the plaintiff but who could have been classified as collateral participants under prior caselaw will not be accorded statutory seller status unless it can be proven that they solicited the security sale.96
These individuals will not be subject to liability under section 12, and
based on previous Second Circuit case precedent, their potential liability as a group has been significantly restricted by Pinter.9 7
The Second Circuit then went on to classify Ruffa & Hanover as
falling within the category of collateral participants whose potential
seller liability would be contracted rather than expanded by the Pinter
case.9 8 The firm's conduct in the questioned securities transaction
was characterized as consisting "solely of the ministerial act of mailing a copy of the private placement memorandum to Wilson at
Rodolfy's request."99 Interpreting the Pinter Court, the Second Circuit noted that the primary concern had to do with persons such as
individual brokers who were likely to act on behalf of the seller and to
do so for a personal pecuniary profit.loo It would be a severe misinterpretation of the Pinterstandard to view the actions of Ruffa & Hanover as constituting the kind of solicitation necessary to delineate seller
status under the 1933 statute.Ol The provisions of section 12 are severe and should not be extended to include professionals such as lawyers who have merely performed normal professional duties. The

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

ners. Furthermore, liability under section 12(2) could at that time only be permitted where scienter could be proven. The Wilson court noted that had the
Mayer case been decided subsequent to Pinter v. Dahl, the material question
would not have been whether or not the general partners had scienter but would
have focused on whether or not the financial gain which they had received upon
creating the exchange "was the legal equivalent of solicitation of a sale." Wilson
v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989).
Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126-27.
Id. at 1127.
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Wilson court did admit that where an attorney earned actual commissions from the seller for convincing clients to make an investment in a
security offering, he would be liable as a statutory seller.102
The final issue dealt with by the Second Circuit in the Wilson case
concerned Ruffa & Hanover's potential liability as aiders and abettors.

03

Wilson attempted to argue that the Pinter decision did not

rule out the possibility of aider and abettor liability under section
12.104 The court of appeals refused to adopt this approach holding
instead that there was no difference "under Section 12 between liability based on aiding and abetting and liability based on collateral participation."l05 In this respect, the Second Circuit adopted the position
put forward by the SEC as an amicus party in the Pinter case.1 0 6
Based on this analysis the Second Circuit again concluded that Ruffa
& Hanover could not be held liable as statutory sellers of securities
under section 12(2), but that such a determination in no way diminished their potential liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.107
B. Ninth Circuit-Moore v. Kayport Package ExpresslOs
The principals involved in this business venture organized tax
sheltered limited partnerships. The limited partnership interests
were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission despite the fact that they were securities as defined by federal statute.09 The same interests also did not qualify for exemption from the
102. Id.
103. Id. The court agreed with the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission as put forward in its amicus brief:
Section 12(2) does not permit an analogy to tort or criminal law. The
provision merely imposes civil liability on a statutory seller in favor of an
aggrieved investor; it neither defines violations nor makes certain acts

unlawful. As a result, a criminal law analogy is not available (citation

omitted). Likewise, the Section based on recission is not derived from
tort law principles, making the tort theory employed in the context of the
Section 10(b) inapplicable.
Id. (quoting Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 19).
104. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir.
1989). Wilson argued that footnote 24 of the Pinterdecision established that the
Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility of aider and abettor liability under
Section 12, citing Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir.
1986), and In re Caesar's Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.

1973).
105. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir.
1989). See also In re Caesar's Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
106. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir.
1989).

107. Id.
108. 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989).

109. Id. at 533.
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registration process. 1 ' 0 During 1981 and 1982, sales of these limited
partnership interests aggregated in excess of $3.8 million."'1
In addition to failing to register the limited partnership interests,
the principals engaged in practices deemed to be fraudulent and made
numerous misrepresentations to investors with regard to the financial
viability of each partnership interest. 112 After the investors lost a significant amount of their investment they filed an initial complaint in
September 1983 alleging violations of section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933.113 They sued the principals involved in the venture as

well as various accountants, lawyers, and stock brokers who had allegedly assisted in the sale of the investments.
The district court dismissed the claims against the defendant accountants and lawyers stating that they had not been a substantial
factor in facilitating the securities transactions in question.1 4 As a
result, they were not subject to liability under section 12(2). The
Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling but did so on the basis of an analysis of the Pinter decision which had been decided by the Supreme
Court subsequent to the decision rendered by the lower district
court."15

Initially, the court of appeals acknowledged that the "substantial
factor test" had been the primary standard to be used in establishing
seller status and had been appropriately applied by the district

court.1 3 6 The court of appeals noted that under this test "persons who

did not pass title in a sales transaction, and thus were not in privity
with the purchaser, may nonetheless be liable as a 'seller' if their actions were both necessary to and a substantial factor in bringing about
the sales transaction."1 1 7 The Ninth Circuit went on to recognize that
due to the opinion in the Pinter case, seller status liability had been
extended beyond those who passed title to a security to include those
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged several pendent state causes of action. Id.
114. Id. at 534.
115. Id. at 537. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Under the Pinteranalysis, (attorneys and accountants) are only subject
to section 12(2) liability if they solicited the purchases and were motivated, at least in part, by financial gain .... Here, the investors did not
allege that the lawyers or accountants played any role at all in soliciting
the purchases. Rather, the investors alleged that these defendants performed professional services in their respective capacities as accountants
and lawyers.
Id. (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 535.
117. Id.
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who solicited a purchase.'13 The court then reviewed the primary
findings of the Pinter decision and applied them to the facts in the
Moore case to determine whether the defendant accountants and attorneys had in fact solicited the purchase of securities. This analysis
was based on whether they were motivated to serve a personal financial interest or that of the securities owner.11 9
The court of appeals established that there is an important distinction between those who solicit purchases and those who simply assist
in the solicitation effort.12o It is clear that the Pinter Court rejected
the substantial factor test because it fails to distinguish between actual solicitation and mere collateral participation in the offer to
sale.121 The Ninth Circuit focused on the Pinter Courts statement
that professionals such as attorneys and accountants should not be
held liable under section 12(1) simply for providing professional services. 12 2 Such an application of section 12(1) strict liability, the court
argued, might expose these professionals to excessive liability.123

Moore also argued that the Pinterseller status standard only applies
to section 12(1) and that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
opportunity to apply it to section 12(2).124 As a result, the Ninth Circuit should apply the substantial factor standard in 12(2) litigation.125
This argument was based on the claim that section 12(1) is a strict
liability provision whereas section 12(2) permits the defense of reasonable care. 12 6 Secondly, plaintiff investor argued that section 12(2) is
based in tort law while section 12(1) is based in contract law; therefore, "the related concepts of proximate cause and substantial factor
are thus appropriate in actions under the tort-based section 12(2),
even though more involvement is required by Pinter in actions under
section 12(1)."127

The court of appeals rejected this contention stating that the language contained in section 12(2) is identical to that in section 12(1).128
Reference to the definitions section of the statute indicates that the
word "offers" is meant to apply to all provisions of section 12.129 In

addition, the purpose of both subsections is to promote full and fair
118. Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the PinterCourt did not define the term
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

"solicit" but explained that a solicitation could not take place where a person's
motivation was to solely benefit the buyer. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 535-36.
Id.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court stated:
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disclosure of information needed by potential securities investors.13 0
The court concluded its analysis by stating that the Pinter seller status standard was the appropriate standard for determining liability
under both sections 12(2) and 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.131
The court then turned to an analysis of the facts in the Moore case
relative to its conclusion that the Pinter standard must necessarily
displace the substantial factor test. Regarding the involvement of the
defendant accountants, the plaintiffs argued that they had drafted financial documents which the brokers had used in selling the unregistered securities.13 2 The attorneys allegedly drafted false or
misleading prospectuses, directed the issuance of securities, participated in meetings where the promotional literature was drafted, provided advice and counsel to the security owners, and drafted tax
opinions and permitted these opinions to be included in the promotional materials.13 3 Additionally, one attorney supposedly allowed his
name to be used on the promotional literature as general counsel to

the firm.13 4 These allegations were dismissed as failing to state a

claim under section 12(2) since these professionals would only be subject to liability if they had "solicited" the securities purchases motivated, to some degree, by a personal financial gain.13 5 The court
specifically stated that the investor plaintiffs had not alleged that the
defendant lawyers and accountants had played any role whatsoever in
the soliciting of the stock purchases.136 The investors simply alleged
that the defendants had performed professional services to facilitate
the transaction.13 7 This type of conduct is insufficient to confer seller
status under the Pinter standard.
C. The Wilson and Moore Case Line
In Royal American Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp.,138 Royal
American Managers, Inc. ("RAM") made a decision in 1984 to
Moreover, the section 2(3) definition of "offers" applies with equal force

to sections 12(1) and 12(2); and the word "offers" appears as part of parallel introductory language common to both sections 12(1) and 12(2). It

seems plain from the statute that the word "offers" means the same
thing in both sections.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court of appeals also affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the
pendent state claims against the accountant and lawyer defendants. Id.
138. 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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purchase an insurance or reinsurance company.' 3 9 James Wining,
Vice-Chairman of RAM, entered into discussions with Joseph Ambriano, one of the officers and directors of IRC Holding Corporation. IRC
wholly owned the Interamerica Reinsurance Corporation ("Interamerica").140 Willie Schonacher, Chairman and CEO of RAM, soon became

involved with the discussions, and Wining eventually proposed that
RAM purchase 50% of Interamerica's stock.141 IRC rejected this offer
since it not only would mean that IRC would lose control of Interamerica, but also that the New York State Insurance Department
("NYSID") would have to preapprove such a deal given the possibility
that the transaction might be considered a "change of control" of Interamerica under New York law.142 Since the prior approval process
could take many months, IRC preferred to avoid it.
The parties finally decided to contact Gerald Dolman, IRC's attorney, who had formerly been an NYSID employee and had been instrumental in drafting the state law requiring preapproval.143 Do]man
told Wining that in his opinion, a sale of 49% of the stock would not
require preapproval.144 On October 30, 1984, the parties and Dolman
met, and Dolman once again explained his experience and opinion in
the matter. Representations were also made concerning the appointment of RAM nominees to assist in the directorship and management
of Interamerica.14 5 Following this meeting, the parties' attorneys prepared contracts and related documents for the sale of 49% of Interamerica's stock. At a final meeting in December, Ambriano stated
that the terms of the documents did not agree with the terms discussed by the parties. The attorneys were eventually excluded from
the meeting, and the representations earlier made by IRC were allegedly repeated to Wining and Schonacher.14 6
RAM finally purchased a 49% interest in Interamerica for nearly
four million dollars.14 7 However, the NYSID learned of the sale and
told Dolman that prior approval of the sale was necessary.148 NYSID
ignored Dolman's arguments to the contrary and began requesting information from RAM. RAM was initially cooperative, but by the autumn of 1985, it had stopped providing information and asked that the
process be put on hold.149 As of the time of the court of appeals opin139. Id. at 1013.
140. Id.

141. Id.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ion, the dispute had not been resolved even though RAM continued to
control 49% of Interamerica's stock.150
RAM filed suit against IRC, Ambriano, and Dolman, seeking rescission and damages.151 It alleged that all three defendants violated
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934152
and section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and were further guilty
of common law fraud.153 These allegations were based on the argument that the purchase resulted from the defendants' misrepresentations concerning the preapproval process.15 4 IRC and Ambriano crossclaimed against Dolman for legal malpractice.-55 A jury trial was
held, but the district court dismissed most of RAM's claims, including
all claims against Dolman. However, the section 10(b) and common
law fraud claims against Ambriano and IRC went to the jury. RAM
moved to amend its complaint to avoid the dismissal of its claims
against Dolman, but these motions were denied.156 The jury found for
the defendants, and the district court then dismissed the rest of the
claims.'57 RAM filed an appeal, contending, inter alia, that the district court erred in dismissing its section 12(2) claim against Dolman.158 The court of appeals began its discussion of this argument by
noting that, unlike section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, section 12(2) of the
1933 Act applies only to the "seller of securities."'

59

"Seller" was de-

fined by Pinter as an "owner who passed title, or other interest in the
security, to the buyer for value," or a "person who successfully solicits
the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own
financial interests or those of the securities owner."160 The court went
on to quote Pinter'sexhortation against exposing experts, such as attorneys, to section 12(2) liability merely because they rendered professional services to a seller. 16 1
The court of appeals ruled that Dolman clearly was not a seller.
First, he was not an owner who passed title. Secondly, IRC, not Dolman, initiated the negotiations, and thus solicited the sale since Amb150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
Royal American Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1014 (2d
Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1013-15.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id.
Id. RAM further contended that the district court improperly did not allow it to
amend its complaint to allege legal malpractice against Dolman. RAM did not
challenge the jury's verdict but did challenge the court's determinations regarding its Section 12(2) claims against Ambriano and IRC.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1016-1017 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642, 647 (1988)).
Id. at 1017.
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riano had suggested how to structure the sale to avoid the preapproval
process. Dolman did not even attend critical meetings and departed
some meetings early. Furthermore, he did not "earn a commission
from an actual seller for persuading [the buyer] to make a particular
investment." Although Dolman was a director and executive committee member of Interamerica, it was apparent that Ambriano ran the
for
company. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing
62
lack of proof the section 12(2) claim brought against Dolman.'
In Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc.,163 a case brought in the Southern District
of New York, the defendant, Rx Plus, was a corporation164 whose purpose was to establish a chain of drug stores.165 In early 1987, Rx Plus
issued a confidential private placement memorandum to the various
plaintiffs.' 6 6 The named plaintiff, Alison Sellin, invested $60,000 in
Rx Plus' stock.167 The plaintiffs later alleged that the memorandum
did not meet the disclosure requirements provided for in federal securities laws or SEC regulations.168 In September 1987, Rx Plus admitted that this might be true, and offered investors the opportunity to
rescind their purchases. Sellin and the other plaintiffs did so, but
when no refund was forthcoming, they filed a federal lawsuit against
Rx Plus' parent corporation, members of Rx Plus' corporate board, and
the attorney, individually, who drafted the placement memorandum,
as well as his law firm.169 The suit, grounded on section 12 of the

1933 Act, alleged that the defendants had intentionally released a deficient placement memorandum, and further alleged that the law firm
involved in marketing the improperly issued Rx
had been directly
Plus stock.' 7 0
The attorney and his law firm moved for summary judgment on the
claims against them.'17 After an extensive discussion of the law pertaining to summary judgment, the district court stated that "[i]n this
case, the central issue is whether a law firm which prepared a private
placement memorandum used in allegedly fraudulent sales of securities can be held liable under Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933."172 The district court began its discussion of this issue by analyzing Pinter. It stated that while the Supreme Court recognized the
162. Id.
163. 730 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
164. Rx Plus was a subsidiary of Medi-Rx America, Inc., a Delaware corporation

whose business involved selling prescribed medications and medical equipment

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

by mail order.
Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1289, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
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similarity of the language of sections 12(1) and 12(2), it had not decided whether the definition of "seller" for section 12(1) purposes applied to Section 12(2).173 However, the Second Circuit had recently
ruled in Capriv. Murphy,174 that based on prior Second Circuit precedent which held that the language of sections 12(1) and 12(2) had
identical meanings, 17 5 a section 12(2) defense should be analyzed
under the Pinter framework.176
The district court also took note of the Wilson decision.177 It stated
that the Wilson court read Pinter to say that liability cannot be extended to persons who only have a "collateral role" in the preparation
of a securities issue. Instead, to be liable under section 12, a person
must have been involved in the actual solicitation of sales and have
been motivated by the desire to make a profit.178 In the instant case,

attorney Pillai and his firm produced affidavits indicating that they
had no involvement in the deal that would cause them to violate section 12.179 Since plaintiffs could only bring conclusory allegations of
the attorney defendants' potential involvement, no reasonable jury
could find that they had violated section 12.180 Therefore, the district
court 8granted
summary judgment to attorney Pillai and his law
1
firM.1

The Ackerman v. Schwartzl82 case concerned a fraudulent tax
credit scheme. In 1983 and 1984, Gary Van Waeyenberghe and Carl
Leibowitz promoted a tax shelter investment involving ethanol manufacturing.183 In exchange for each $10,000 invested, an investor
would receive an instant tax credit of $20,000, a $10,000 deduction,
and the opportunity to profit from the business..8 4 An attorney, Howard Schwartz, prepared an opinion letter stating that investors would
be entitled to these benefits under the Internal Revenue Code.185
More than 100 persons invested in this scheme which turned out to
have several problems. First, the IRS disallowed the credits and deductions.1S6 Secondly, Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz illegally
173. Id. at 1291-92.
174. 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988). Capri does not involve a professional such as an

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

attorney or accountant, and full discussion of it is therefore beyond the scope of
this Article.
Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. For a discussion of Wilson see section IIIA supra.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1294.
947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842-43.
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siphoned cash from the deal, and they both later pleaded guilty to assorted crimes in connection with this scheme.187 Lastly, it turned out
that the ethanol manufacturing equipment, valued in the offering documents at $100,000, was actually worth about $5,000.188
With the money gone and Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz in jail,
the investors sued Schwartz, the attorney who prepared the opinion
letter. This letter made several misrepresentations: that the several
corporations involved in the deal were unaffiliated when, in fact, they
were all shells owned by or affiliated with Van Waeyenberghe and
Leibowitz; that the equipment was worth $100,000; that the equipment would be in use by the end of 1983; and that the IRS would be
"unable to deny" the credits and deductions to investors.1 8 9 Schwartz
and one of his associates disputed who had made the "due diligence"
inquiry regarding these facts, but this inquiry was not made, even
though the opinion letter arguably implied that all necessary investigation had been conducted.190
The court of appeals described the complaint filed in the case as
"implausible" and filled with references to inapplicable statutes. 19 1
The district court had previously deleted many claims and granted
192
summary judgment for Schwartz based on the 1983 transactions.
As for the 1984 transactions, the district court eventually concluded,
inter alia, that Schwartz was not a "seller" under section 12, and
plaintiffs appealed.193
Initially, the court of appeals discussed the scope of section 12, and
then cited Pinterfor the proposition that although section 12(1) covers
"sellers" who are not in privity with the purchaser, it does not reach
94
persons, such as attorneys, who facilitate sales but are not "sellers."1
The court went on to state that plaintiffs' claim that Schwartz could
still be liable under section 12(2) foundered on the same rock because
the statute does not permit differentiation between sections 12(1) and
12(2).
Both § 12(1) and § 12(2) identify the person who "offers or sells a security" as
the one potentially liable. "Offer" and "sell" are defined terms in the '33 Act
... and cannot mean one thing in § 12(1) and something else in § 12(2). Under
Pintera lawyer is not a seller, and the investor is not "the person purchasing
such security from" a lawyer. Plaintiffs' theory that Schwartz is a seller because his opinion letter played an important role in making the units market187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. The district court also held that Schwartz did not have the state of mind
necessary for liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id.
194. Id.
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able is just another version of the proposition that § 12 covers anyone whose
participation is a "substantial factor" leading to the transaction. Pinterconsidered and rejected [this] approach to liability under § 12.195

The court of appeals further noted that the structure of the 1933
Act supported this conclusion. Section 11 of that law creates liability
for issuers, underwriters, and anyone who signs a registration statement containing a materially false or misleading statement.19 6 Statutory defenses such as due diligence, reliance on expert opinion, or lack
of causation are available to everyone but the issuer.197 Section 12, on
the other hand, is harsher and lacks any reference to such defenses.19 s
If the terms "seller" and "purchaser" in section 12 were read as
broadly as Ackerman and the other plaintiffs would like, section 11
would be entirely ignored by potential plaintiffs. Therefore, by limiting the scope of section 12, the Congressional intent to give professionals, such as attorneys and accountants, access to those defenses would
be upheld.199
Ackerman and the other plaintiffs argued that Schwartz should at
least be held liable as an aider and abettor.200 The court rejected this
argument for the same reason that it rejected a broad reading of section 12: it would upset the framework of the 1933 Act to allow for
liability for aiding and abetting. 2 0 Therefore, "there is no liability for
aiding and abetting a violation of § 12."202 Thus, the court of appeals
affirmed, inter alia, the district court's dismissal of the section 12
claims against Schwartz.203
D.

What Constitutes Solicitation?

The Wilson and Moore cases are significant in that they provided
the first indication as to how the new seller status standard will be
applied to attorneys and accountants. In Pinter the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the substantial factor test as the preferred standard
for establishing seller status. This test had the effect of bringing
within the liability umbrella a number of professionals performing
routine duties and acting as merely collateral participants in the security issuance process. By rejecting the substantial factor test the
Supreme Court has sent a clear message that the reach of the 1933
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed several cases, including
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 1989) and the Wilson decision discussed in section III.A supra.
202. Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).
203. Id. at 849.
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Act is to be limited to those individuals and professionals more closely
connected with the actual sales and purchase transaction. In referring to the potential liability of accountants and lawyers under the
substantial factor test, the Supreme Court notes that the test would
extend section 12 liability "to participants only remotely related to the
relevant aspects of the sales transaction."204 In effect, the substantial
factor test was in reality a "substantial participation" test grounded in
the concept of proximate causation.
By retreating from the substantial factor test to a standard driven
more by the act of solicitation, securities professionals such as accountants and lawyers are in a better position to perform their roles
without having to be overly concerned about potential liability as sellers. The Moore court stated that the providing of professional services
is an activity which should be made separate and distinct from the
solicitation effort.2o5 The court went on to draw a distinction between
the act of solicitation and assisting in the solicitation effort.206 It concluded that the attorneys involved in that case had merely assisted in
the sales transaction and, therefore, could not be deemed to have solicited purchases.207
This analysis is a perfect example of a situation where the substantial factor test might have imposed liability on the attorneys as collateral participants despite their failure to have actually solicited the
purchase for a personal pecuniary gain. This conclusion is buttressed
by the court's conclusion that a wide variety of activities engaged in by
the attorneys could not be used to conclusively determine that they
had engaged in solicitation. These activities included permitting professional opinions to be included in promotional materials and allowing their names to be used on the promotional literature as general
counsel to the firm.2OS
The Wilson court reached a similar conclusion that attorney and
accountant liability is further restricted as opposed to expanded by
the Pinterdecision relative to the substantial factor test:
After Pinter,some persons who are not in privity with the plaintiff but who

would have been collateral participants under our prior case law are now not
statutory sellers because they did not solicit the sales in question. Such persons are no longer subject to any liability under Section 12.209

Ruffa & Hanover were then deemed to fall within this category of participants and held not liable as solicitors for having completed the
mere "ministerial act of mailing a copy of the private placement mem204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988).
Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.
1989).
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orandum" to potential purchasers.210 The Wilson court characterized
the law firm's actions as "usual professional functions" and that the
Supreme Court's primary concern was aimed more at individuals such
as brokers who are more correctly viewed as acting on behalf of the
seller.211
The three post-Wilson and Moore cases 212 illustrate just how difficult a task it is for plaintiffs to assign liability to attorneys, accountants, or other professionals under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The
Royal American Managers case stresses the requirement that the professional be someone who actually passes title to or directly solicits
the sale from a purchaser. Even deep involvement, such as being an
officer or director of one of the entities involved or offering expert opinions crucial to closing a sale, will not be sufficient to make a professional a "seller." It would be difficult for any professional to be any
more involved in a sale of securities than attorney Dolman was without actually performing the sales or solicitation himself, yet Dolnan
still was not held liable under section 12(2).
Sellin v. Rx Plus involves a potentially very serious situation, one
in which the professionals, an attorney and his firm, were alleged to
have intentionally prepared a deficient placement memorandum.
However, the Sellin court takes an important step that the Supreme
Court in Pinterdeclined to consider, in that it states directly that the
definitions and standards applied to section 12(1) and section 12(2)
ought to be the same. This reasoning insulated the defendant attorneys in that case, and is an important safeguard for professionals involved in the securities industry. Sellin also illustrates how difficult it
is for plaintiffs to overcome the threat of summary judgment in section
12(2) cases. Mere allegations, without evidence beyond the allegedly
deficient documents themselves, are apparently inadequate, particularly in light of the defendant professionals' affidavits concerning their
activities. Professionals should learn from Sellin to thoroughly document the extent of their involvement in securities offerings in order to
prevent future questions regarding their participation.
Ackerman v. Schwartz is an excellent example of several aspects of
section 12(2) litigation involving professionals. First, like Royal American Managers, it illustrates that even significant involvement in an
offering, such as preparing a deficient opinion letter without conducting sufficient investigation, is not enough to trigger section 12(2)
liability. Such conduct may bring a professional under other sections
of the 1933 or 1934 Acts, or may expose her or him to charges of malpractice, but is insufficient to establish section 12(2) liability. Second,
the Ackerman court provides a helpful analysis regarding the inter210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra section III.C.
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play between section 12 and other sections of the Act, and uses that
interplay as a justification for shielding professionals from liability.
Professional defendants in future section 12 cases should be prepared
to make similar arguments. Third, Ackerman stresses the point made
in the Second Circuit's Wilson decision that aiding and abetting liability no longer applies to section 12 litigation.
IV. THE ACCOUNTANTS ROLE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS
A.

Professional Accounting Standards

The preparation of financial reports is the genesis of an accountant's liability, and their preparation is governed by a body of auditing
standards. 2 13 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, clearly
provides that the audit goal is the expression of an opinion on the representational fairness of the financial statements. The opinion is the
result of the auditor's judgement, not a statement of fact, and is a view
that must be based upon sound reasoning and the application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).214 Although management's primary responsibility for the financial statements is clearly
distinguished, auditors cannot remove themselves from their opinion
or the responsibility that emanates from it.215 Additionally, public offerings which include financial statements prepared by or audited by
the accountant fall under the same umbrella of professional responsibility and conduct standards.
Standards of auditing performance are promulgated for the profession by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). First, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) address basic auditor performance,216 while the Code of Professional
Conduct governs ethical performance considerations and is designed
to promote public trust and confidence.217 The GAAS include ten
Standards that form the professional foundation for the practitioner
213. Kathy Williams, Lawsuit Increase, MANAGEmNT

'214.

ACCOUNTING, Oct. 1990, at 16.
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Audit-

ing Standards No. 1, § 110 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972), reprintedin 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 150 (1991). This code
provides: "The objective of the ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they
present fairly, in all material respects, financial position, results of operations,
and its cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accountingprinciples."
Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
(1988)(amended 1992)), reprinted in 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDA DS (CCH)
AU §§ 50-591 (June 1, 1993).
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and which are broken down into three categories: General Standards,
Standards of Field Work, and Standards of Reporting. 2 18
The General Standards pertain to the auditor as an individual, and
initially require that the auditor be technically competent and maintain independence. Any factor that even appears to indicate a dependence or relationship between the client and the auditor must be
avoided, and although each standard is significant, particular culpability can be generated by General Standard number 3 which calls for
"[dlue professional care." 2 19 Due care requires the typical standard of
work that could be expected of the reasonable and prudent accountant. This has been interpreted to include adequately training staff,
following the promulgated standards and working under adequate supervision with proper review of all completed work. It does not insure
an infallibility based upon errors in judgment, but it does prohibit dishonesty, bad faith, and negligence. Whether this standard requires
218. General Accepted Auditing Standards:
General Standards
1. The audit is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in
mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the
audit and the preparation of the report.
Standardsof Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are
to be properly supervised.
2. A sufficient understanding of the internal control structure is to
be obtained to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be performed.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through
inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under audit.
Standardsof Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
2. The report shall identify those circumstances in which such principles have not been consistently observed in the current period
in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the
report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to
the effect that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall
opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefore should be
stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is associated with
financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's work, if any, and the degree
of responsibility the auditor is taking.
219. Id.
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the auditor to recognize an obligation to the complete spectrum of financial statement users is questionable, but this is certainly the position advanced by those investors seeking to impose liability on the
auditor via section 12.
The Standards of Field Work pertain to the management and operation of the audit. From the outset, all work must be adequately
planned and supervised. The second field work standard requires an
analysis of the internal control system, which includes all of the rules,
regulations and practices that govern the audited firm's accounting
system. The field work standards insure that firm assets are protected, management policies are followed, the accounting data are accurate, and only authorized transactions are permitted to occur. An
auditor usually relies on the internal control system, rather than examining every accounting and financial transaction. A systematic
process of evaluation is used to verify the strength and reliability of
the internal control system and the resulting financial data produced
by it.
The Standards of Reporting focus on the content of the report. The
initial reporting standard requires the auditor to disclose any departures from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Few auditors
would permit departures from GAAP although the standards permit
such departures when the auditor can justify them. However, since
the burden of proof for these deviations falls upon the auditor and her
firm, departures from reporting standards are seldom observed. The
second reporting standard requires disclosure of any inconsistent application of generally accepted accounting principles. To the non-accountant, the sanctioning of deviations from GAAP may appear to be
contradictory. However, GAAP does permit the application of conflicting principles which, when individually and consistently applied, will
not degrade the integrity of the financial statements. Disclosure of
these conflicts, along with their related effect on the financial statements, is required.
The third reporting standard requires "informative disclosures" of
all material financial information. The major risk for the auditor is
the failure to disclose or an inadequate disclosure of material information as required by GAAP. Informative disclosures are typically included in the footnotes to the financial statements and may not always
be fully appreciated by non-accountants. Footnotes must be straightforward, provide a concise statement of the facts, and not present any
opinions. The guiding legal standard for footnote content is "materiality," and while any material item which may affect the financial statement must be disclosed, there is sufficient litigation to establish that
there is often a significant difference of opinion as to what constitutes
"material information."
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An additional consideration regarding this standard is the protection of client confidences. The auditor must not disclose confidential
information which may erode the client's confidence in the auditor and
which may cause the client to restrict free access to required information. This places the auditing professional in a precarious legal situation since auditors do not enjoy the confidentiality protection afforded
attorneys and their clients.
B. Accountant's Code of Professional Conduct
The Code of Professional Conduct contains both rules which are
more definite, 2 20 and principles which are more equivocal. 2 21 Consequently, it allows considerable latitude for interpretation by the public
and the judiciary. For example, in the first Article, an auditor must
exercise "sensitive professional and moral judgements" for all their activities. Additional Articles continue in a similar vein as they delineate the qualities for professional service to the public (Article 2),
220. CODE OF PROFESSioNAL CoNDuCT, supra note 217, at ET §§ 90-591.
221. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, supranote 217, at ET §§ 50-57. The Principles
of Professional Conduct are as follows:

Article I - Responsibilities
In carryingout their responsibilities as professionals, members
should exercise sensitive professional and moral judgements in all
their activities.
Article H - The Public Interest
Members should accept the obligation to act in a way that will
serve the public interest,honor the public trust, and demonstratecommitment to professionalism.
Article III - Integrity

To maintainand broadenpublic confidence, members shouldperform all professional responsibilities with the highest sense of
integrity.
Article IV - Objectivity and Independence
A member should maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts of
interest in dischargingprofessional responsibilities. A member in
publicpractice should be independent in fact and appearance when
providing auditingand other attestationservices.
Article V - Due Care

A member should observe the profession's technical and ethical
standards,strive continually to improve competence and the quality of
services, and dischargeprofessional responsibility to the best of the
member's ability.

Arie VI - Scope and Nature of Services
A member in public practice should observe the Principlesof the
Code of ProfessionalConduct in determining the scope and nature of
services to be provided.
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mandate that public confidence be maintained (Article 3), require freedom from conflicting interests (Article 4), promote public trust and independence both in fact and appearance (Article 4), and require
technical competency (Article 5).
Fortunately, the Code is amplified and illustrated by Interpretations of Rules of Conduct and Ethical Rulings. These clarifications
provide examples using hypothetical fact patterns that the auditor can
consider when confronted with an ethical problem. The Ethical Rulings cover subjects such as the effect on independence that results
from honorary directorships and trusteeships bestowed upon auditors,
as well as the percentage of an auditor-investor interest that will constitute a material amount thereby affecting the accountant's independence and calling his impartiality into question.
C. The SEC, The Auditor and New Security Offerings
As part of the registration process for a new security offering, auditors are frequently called on to write letters based upon the accounting and auditing requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. As a
result of conferences with clients, underwriters, and legal counsel, the
audit report will make comments in the form of a "comfort letter." The
process does not involve a full audit but rather a reasonable investigation. Unfortunately, the definition of "reasonable investigation" has
not been authoritatively established, hence the auditor is operating
under a higher level of risk. These letters normally comment on auditor independence, financial statement compliance with Securities Act
registration requirements, changes in selected financial statement
items during the period subsequent to the preparation dates, and tables, statistics, and other financial information required for registration. Considering the potential liability associated with preparation of
these "comfort letters," the prudent auditor operating under the "due
care" standard should carefully read and follow the guidelines provided in Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 72.222
Auditor work related to a new offering is also governed by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulations. Regulation S-X
provides clear definitions for the qualification of both certified and
public accountants and for accountants' reports. 2 2 3 Whether an individual qualifies as a certified or public accountant is dependent upon
the requirements set forth by his or her particular state licensing
agency.2 2 4

222. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,

Statement on Audit-

ing Standards No. 72 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993), reprintedin
1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 634 (June 1, 1993).

223. Regulation S-X, SEC Accounting R. (CCH) Reg. §§ 210.2-01 to 210.2-051 (Feb.
1991). Regulation S-X is also found in 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1994).
224. Id. § 210.2-01(a). Section 210.2-01(a) provides:
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Additionally, the Regulations comment on when an accountant's
independence can be called into question, and this point is certainly
germane to the "seller" issue under section 12(2). An accountant will
not be considered independent if there is any direct financial interest
or any material, indirect financial interest between the parties. Materiality is not defined although the Commission will not be limited to
the case in question while evaluating the independence issue, but
rather will look to any "evidence bearing on all relationships between
the accountant and that person."225 Certain individuals, such as proThe Commission will not recognize any person as a certified public accountant who is not duly registered and in good standing as such under
the laws of the place of his residence or principal office. The Commission
will not recognize any person as a public accountant who is not in good
standing and entitled to practice as such under the laws of the place of
his residence or principal office.
Id.
225. Id. at § 210.2-01(b) & (c). Section 210.2-01(b) & (c) provides:
(b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public accountant or
public accountant as independent who is not in fact independent.
For example, an accountant will be considerednot independent with
respect to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or other
affiliates
(1) in which, during the period of his professional engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date
of his report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm had, or was
committed to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial interest;
(2) with which, during the period of his professional engagement to
examine the financial statements being reported on, at the date
of his report or during the period covered by the financial statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was connected as a
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee. A firm's independence will not be deemed to be affected
adversely where a former officer or employee of a particular person is employed by or becomes a partner, shareholder or other
principal in the firm and such individual has completely disassociated himself from the person and its affiliates and does not participate in auditing financial statements of the person or its
affiliates covering any period of his employment by the person.
For the purposes of § 210.2-01(b), the term "member" means
[i] all partners, shareholders, and other principals in the firm,
[ii] any professional employee involved in providing any professional service to the person, its parents, subsidiaries, or
other affiliates, and
[iii] any professional employee having managerial responsibilities and located in [the engagement office] or other office of
the firm which participates in a significant portion of the
audit.
(c) In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not independent with respect to a particular person, the Commission will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances, including
evidence bearing all relationships between the accountant and that
person or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in connection with the filing of reports with the
Commission.
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moters, are specifically excluded as independent parties.2 26 Other relationships which will preclude meeting statutory independence
2 27
include: underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee.
For purposes of determining independence, membership in a firm includes all partners, shareholders, other principals, any professional
providing services to the client, or a professional with managerial responsibilities who is located within the same or participating office of
the firm.228
As for the content and quality of accountant reports, the regulations require that it be prepared in good form with all the associated
titles, dates, the auditor's name and address, and a list of statements
covered.229 A clear statement of opinion is required with references to
GAAP and GAAS, and any exceptions must be explicitly noted and
explained. These Commission requirements mirror the professional
standards set forth by the AICPA.230
Id. (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. § 210.2-02. Section 210.2-02 provides:

(a) Technical requirements. The accountant's report:
(1) Shall be dated;
(2) shall be signed manually;
(3) shall indicate the city and State where issued; and
(4) shall identify without detailed enumeration the financial statements covered by the report.
(b) Representations as to the audit. The accountant's report:
(1) shall state whether the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards; and
(2) shall designate any auditing procedures deemed necessary by the
accountant under the circumstances of the particular case, which
have been omitted, and the reasons for their omission. Nothing
in this rule shall be construed to imply authority for the omission
of any procedure which independent accountants would ordinarily employ in the course of an audit made for the purpose of expressing the opinions required by paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Opinion to be expressed. The accountant's report shall state clearly:
(1) The opinion of the accountant in respect of the financial statements covered by the report and the accounting principles and
practices reflected therein; and
(2) the opinion of the accountant as to the consistency of the application of the accounting principles, or as to any changes in such
principles which have a material effect on the financial
statements.
(d) Exceptions. Any matters to which the accountant takes exception
shall be clearly identified, the exception thereto specifically and
clearly stated, and, to the extent practicable, the effect of each such
exception on the related financial statements given. (See Section 101
of the Codification of Financial Reporting Policies.)
Id.
230. See supra sections IVA and IV.B.
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Finally, in addition to the promoter exclusion outlined above, SEC
regulations expand upon the definition of a "promoter" by requiring
evidence of a clear action or initiative to found and organize a business
enterprise. 2 3 1 A threshold benefit test is set at a minimum often percent of the offering sale proceeds, but this limitation can be waived if
payment to the auditors is constructed as an underwriting commission. Thus, auditors qualifying under this regulation as underwriters
would not be considered promoters. 2 32
V. CONCLUSION
As disenfranchised investors sought to develop new causes of action under the securities statutes, the liability of collateral participants, such as attorneys and accountants, has not really been in
question when that liability is proven pursuant to section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. However, when plaintiffs allege fraudulent
conduct by attorneys in the registration process or selling of a securities offering as constituting a violation of the 1933 Act, section 11 of
that statute affords a variety of statutory defenses including due diligence, reliance on expert opinion, and lack of causation. These are
classic reasonable person defenses in the vein of common law negligence and are available to all defendants except the issuer.
Since attorneys and accountants are not the issuers in any of these
cases, the preferred approach by plaintiffs is to allege conduct rising to
the level of "seller" status and which is sufficiently egregious to constitute a violation of section 12. This denudes the attorneys of the section 11 defenses and turns the action into a matter of potential strict
liability, a result that Congress knowingly endorsed when it constructed these liability provisions. The problem for plaintiffs has been
that the federal courts have not been as willing to expand the concept
231. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(r) (1994). Section 210.1-02(r) provides: The term pronoter

includes (1) Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more
other persons, directly or indirectly takes the initiative in founding
and organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer;
(2) Any person who, in connection with the founding and organizing of
the business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives
in considerationof services or property, or both services and property,
10 percent or more of any class of securitiesof the issuer or 10 percent
or more of the proceeds from the sale of any class of securities. However, a person who receives such securities or proceeds either solely
as underwriting commissions or solely in consideration of property
shall not be deemed a promoter within the meaning of this paragraph if such person does not otherwise take part in founding and
organizingthe enterprise.
Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id.
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of "seller" status as they have in interpreting applications of RICO or
even common law negligence to malfeasance in the securities arena.
The basis of this federal court position is rooted in the Pinterdecision and the Supreme Court's direct rejection of the "substantial factoe test. The Court noted that collateral participants ought to be
adjudged to be "sellers" depending on their relationship with seller
and buyer, rather than focusing on their motivation. The Moore and
Ackerman courts, in applying this precedent, correctly pointed out the
differences in actions seeking strict liability under section 12 and
those cases alleging misconduct not envisioned as falling within the
legislative intent underpinning of the seller liability provision. In
such cases, it now must be established that collateral participants,
such as attorneys and accountants, have actually participated in the
act of solicitation before "seller" status will hold. Otherwise they cannot be stripped of their right to statutory defenses under section 11.
This refusal on the part of the federal courts to expand attorney
and accountant liability should not go unnoticed, nor should it be
taken for granted by professionals involved in the registration and security sales process. There is still substantial room for professional
malpractice under the 1933 Act outside the context of section 12, and
collateral participants must insure that their conduct conforms to
standards that are generally accepted within their profession. Professionals have everything to gain in avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety rising to the level of malpractice or fraud in securities
cases. Despite Pinter and its subsequent case line, it should be expected that lawsuits filed pursuant to the 1933 Act will continue to
include the "seller" status claim in order to gain leverage in the pretrial process. Even where these claims are defeated at the motion
stage, the injury to personal reputation and the financial cost will
most certainly be significant.

